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TERRY: A[N EX-ICOP'S VIEW
JAMES J. FYFE*
Law enforcement officers cannot function simply as agents
who respond to the scenes of crimes and accidents after
they have occurred. The police role always has and always
will be based primarily upon the performance of tasks de-
signed to minimize or prevent such incidents from happen-
ing.I
If there is a unanimous view among cops, it is the belief that
the authority to stop, question and, where danger apparently
exists, to frisk suspicious persons, is an indispensable part of
their work.2 I concur completely, and believe that the best test of
the validity of this view involves no sophisticated legal theoriz-
ing, but is a concrete question of the type that invariably pops up
in police training classes: What should Detective McFadden have
done when he watched John Terry and his companions engage in
activities that any cop-or mildly interested bystander-would
have suspected were the prelude to a stick-up?
The alternatives available to McFadden were limited:
He could have continued to watch surreptitiously. As any
reasonable police instructor would inform the class, however,
this would have involved so many risks that it would have been a
violation of the primary police responsibility to protect life. If
Terry and company proceeded to rob the store they apparently
were casing,3 some innocent person might have been killed or
* Professor of criminal justice and senior public policy research fellow at Temple
University in Philadelphia. Professor Fyfe is a sixteen-year veteran of the New York
City Police Department, from which he retired as a lieutenant in 1979. He received
a Ph.D. from the State University of New York at Albany, and his research and pro-
fessional interests focus on police authority and accountability. He currently is
studying police officers who have been dismissed from the NYPD.
' GEORGE W. O'CONNOR & CHARLES G. VANDERBOSCH, THE PATROL OPERATION
59 (1st ed., 1967).
2 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
3 Critics may opine to the effect that, because McFadden testified in the Terry
suppression hearing that he had never before seen anybody "casing a job," his stop,
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injured. Even if nobody had been hurt during such a robbery,
McFadden would have been left with the problem of apprehend-
ing three robbers, two of whom would almost certainly have had
guns in their hands, as they emerged from the store. This may
well have precipitated a shooting incident on a public street (in
which McFadden was outnumbered) and/or a hostage situation
and, therefore, would also have been a poor attempt toward pro-
tection of life.
McFadden also might have gone in search of a telephone and
called for help (keep in mind that he stopped Terry on October
31, 1963, a couple of weeks after I graduated from the New York
City Police Academy and several years before police anywhere
carried portable radios). But this would have taken him off the
scene at what he suspected was a critical time. His absence
might have given Terry and company the opportunity to commit
a robbery, hurt people, and escape. At best, even if the three
suspects were still loitering when McFadden and his helpers ar-
rived at the scene, they still would have been left with the ques-
tion of whether, and how, to stop and question the three sus-
pects.
McFadden could have approached Terry and company and
questioned them without attempting to determine whether they
were armed. This, an Australian police labor union solicitor
friend recently told me, is what is done by the police he repre-
sents because, absent a full arrest, they are prohibited from
frisking or searching suspicious persons. The occasion for my
friend's call was the most recent in a series of stabbings of Syd-
ney police officers who had stopped-but were prohibited from
frisking-suspicious people under apparently dangerous circum-
stances. My friend did not specifically know of Terry, but he un-
detention and frisk of Terry, Chilton and Katz were arbitrary. McFadden's prior in-
experience with such situations is not a convincing basis upon which to dismiss his
claim of a reasonable suspicion that Terry and company appeared to be engaged in
the prelude to a robbery. It is not surprising that McFadden had never before seen
"people casing a job" because offenders smart enough to come up with better stories
than Chilton's account of having found the guns in a paper bag usually do not case
jobs in front of witnesses. Further, what McFadden did see and testify to was con-
sistent with what robbers do before holding up stores. Before dismissing McFad-
den's account as insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion in an alert officer, critics
should consider what other explanations of the conduct of Terry and company are
viable or whether, had employees of the store apparently being cased seen Terry
and company, they would have been alarmed enough by the suspicious behavior to
call the police.
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derstood that United States police did not have to expose them-
selves to danger in this way, and he was interested in finding out
what could be done to better protect his own officers.4 In this
country, where guns, rather than knives, are the weapon of
choice, reasonable police instructors-like mine-were instruct-
ing their charges long before Terry that police are not paid
enough to put themselves in harm's way in this fashion.'
McFadden could have walked on his way without taking any
action on his suspicions. In this case, regardless of what Terry
and company may have gone on to do, neither he nor McFadden
would have become inextricably linked with detentions short of
arrests. Terry might or might not have robbed the store but,
even if he had, we would never have heard of McFadden because
he would never have admitted to anyone that he had seen and
walked away from Terry and company's suspicious actions.
A. TERRY IN NEW YORK
From this ex-cop's perspective, therefore, McFadden had no
real choice but to do what he did. In fact, Terry had little or no
impact on what police do here in New York City. In 1964, the
' Police in New South Wales currently are permitted to frisk people they rea-
sonably suspect to possess stolen property or "any other thing used or intended to be
used in the commission of an indictable offence," Crimes Act, 1900, no. 40 (Austl.),
but, as interpreted, this provision does not permit preemptive stops or protective
frisks for weapons like that conducted by McFadden. A pending bill would modify
this provision "to create an offence of having custody of a knife in a public place or a
school without a reasonable excuse" (a reasonable excuse being that it is necessary
to one's trade, for preparation of food, for lawful sporting purposes, for sale, for ex-
hibit at a show, as part of an official uniform, or for "genuine religious purposes").
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Bill (Explanatory Note)
Overview (Austl. 1998). The bill would also enable "a police officer to conduct an
electronic or frisk search of a person and an examination of any bag or other per-
sonal effect that the person has with him or if the officer suspects on reasonable
grounds that the person has unlawful custody of a dangerous implement," obviously
including a knife. Id. at div. 2.
6 This does not mean that concerns for the safety of the police are so overwhelm-
ing that they always outweigh citizens' Fourth Amendment rights. Properly framed
as it applies to Terry, the question is whether the safety interests of police officers
investigating what they suspect may be preparations to armed robbery (a situation
that accounts for about 30% of urban police deaths nationally) outweigh the right of
the citizens involved to be free from brief detention and relatively unintrusive
frisks. A negative answer to this question would lead police to simply refrain from
responding to citizens' calls to investigate suspicious people: "Sorry Ma'am, it
doesn't matter that those fellas have been outside your store and peeking in and
ducking in and out of the shadows. If they rob you, let us know and we'll respond
after we have probable cause to arrest them."
19981 1233
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New York State legislature wrote a new "stop and frisk" law
which authorized police officers to stop and question persons
suspected of felonies or certain misdemeanors,' and to frisk them
in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable fear by officers
for their safety. Of this latter provision, an accompanying policy
issued by the New York State Combined Council of Law En-
forcement Officials instructed officers that:
3. No search is appropriate unless the officer "reasonably
suspects that he is in danger." Among the factors that
may be considered in determining whether to search are:
a. Nature of the suspected crime, and whether it involved
the use of a weapon or violence.
b. The presence or absence of assistance to the officer, and
the number of suspects being stopped.
c. The time of the day or night.
d. Prior knowledge of the suspect's record and reputation.
e. The sex of the suspect.
f. The demeanor and seeming agility of the suspect, and
whether his clothes so bulge as to be indicative of con-
cealed weapons.
(This listing is not meant to be all inclusive).
4. Initially, once the determination has been made that
the officer may be in danger, all that is necessary is a
frisk-an external feeling of clothing-such as would re-
veal a weapon of immediate danger to the officer.
5. A search of the suspect's clothing and pockets should
not be made unless something is felt by this frisk-such
as a hard object that feels as if it may be a weapon. In
such event, the officer may search that portion of the sus-
pect's clothing to uncover the article that was felt.
6. If the suspect is carrying an object such as a handbag,
suitcase, sack, etc., which may conceal a weapon, the offi-
6 These were the misdemeanors delineated in Section 552 of the former New
York State Code of Criminal Procedure, and included weapons offenses, possession
of burglar's tools, receiving stolen property, unlawful escape, impairment, carnal
abuse, indecent exposure, obscenity and other indecency provisions, sodomy, rape
and possession of narcotics, amphetamines and hypodermic needles. See N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 108-a (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney
1992)).
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cer should not open that item, but should see that it is
placed out of reach of the suspect so that its presence will
not represent any immediate danger to the officer.7
Thus, New York police had the authority and the informa-
tion necessary to comply with Terry's provisions four years be-
fore the case was decided. At that time, such specific instruction
in any area of police activity was so unusual that the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
singled it out as an exemplar of the type of policy guidance that
police across the country should enact. In bemoaning the ab-
sence of guidance for officers' street-level decisions, the Com-
mission wrote:
One of the most adequate statements of enforcement pol-
icy was produced in New York State in conjunction with
the enactment in 1964 of the new "stop and frisk" law.
Police and prosecuting officials recognized that this newly
legislated authority to stop and question persons short of
arrest and to subject them to a frisk was vulnerable to at-
tack on constitutional grounds, and they were aware that
opposition to its passage would result in its implementa-
tion being closely watched.
It was for these reasons that the New York City Police
Department and the District Attorney's Office joined with
other law enforcement agencies throughout the state to
publish a set of guidelines for operating personnel prior to
the date on which the new law became effective. Five
pages of specific requirements, limitations, prohibitions,
and examples were used to elaborate upon the legislation
which itself is contained in two relatively brief para-
graphs. Emphasis was not placed upon defining the law
so much as it was upon urging the police to exercise re-
straint and to act well within the outer limits of their pre-
scribed authority.8
7 NEW YORK STATE COMBINED COUNCIL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS,
POLICY STATEMENT (1964), in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 40 (1967) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
8 Id. at 17 (footnote omitted). The law apparently was not successful in convinc-
ing NYPD Officer Martin, the arresting officer in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
45 (1968), to employ proper restraint. On March 9, 1965, after observing Sibron loi-
tering with other drug addicts in and around a restaurant on Broadway, he
approached [Sibron] and told him to come outside. Once outside, the officer
said to Sibron, "You know what I am after." According to the officer,
1998] 1235
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Even the 1964 law, as I recall it, was viewed by street cops
as a clarification of longtime practice rather than as a definition
of new authority. The law, in effect, gave the police license to do
what they had already been doing, and put into black and white
the principles that most officers already had learned informally,
or had been taught by their employers. Thus, neither the law
nor the decision was in any way comparable in effect to Mapp v.
Ohio,9 the other Cleveland case that told cops in New York and
elsewhere that they could not simply tell people to assume the
position and subsequently obtain convictions on the basis of
whatever contraband their illegal searches produced.
B. TERRY OUTSIDE NEW YORK
It is probably reasonable to suspect, however, that Terry did
change police behavior in many places outside of New York. The
New York State guidelines fell into a policy void, and were the
first substantive prescriptions for police officers' field behavior
that my colleagues and I had ever received. Indeed, even use of
firearms by officers went ungoverned by NYPD rule until 1972,
when the department issued its first internal administrative
supplement to the Penal Law's vague limits on the use of deadly
force.1"
In 1968, and still today, I suspect, police discretion to stop,
question, and frisk is largely uncontrolled by administrative
rules." During the late 1980s, for example, the International
"Sibron mumbled something and reached into his pocket." Simultaneously,
Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into the same pocket, discovering sev-
eral glassine envelopes, which, it turned out, contained heroin.
Id. In what appears to be a very broad interpretation of the 1964 law, Sibron's con-
viction for drug possession was affirmed by the New York State Court of Appeals.
See People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603 (1966). The conviction was, of course, reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court on the same day that Terry was decided. See Sibron, 392
U.S. 40.
9 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'0 See POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK, TEMPORARY OPERATING
PROCEDURE 237, app. B (1972). Another example of the early 1960's level of police
sophistication in providing guidelines for field officers' behavior comes to mind. An
NYPD insert for officers' memo books purported to enable officers to communicate
with the city's growing Hispanic populations. It included many phonetic common
Spanish phrases ("KOHMO SAY-YAMMA- OOSTEDD"), but included no informa-
tion on how to interpret responses to these questions.
"' As if to underline the dangers of generalizing about the 21,000 or more U.S.
police agencies, a century-old police manual is an exception to my claim about the
absence of guidance for officers confronted by suspicious persons and circumstances:
[Vol. 72:12311236
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Association of Chiefs of Police began to promulgate model poli-
cies for member departments, but these do not yet include a stop,
question and frisk standard. The Manual of the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. does include
such a standard, but it, as well as the accompanying commen-
tary, leave much to the imagination and are optional, rather
than mandatory:
41.2.3 A written directive governs the conduct of field in-
terviews.
Commentary: A field interview program may deprive ac-
tual and potential offenders of some of their initiative in
selecting the time, place, and circumstances for the
commission of crimes. The agency should clearly indicate
what constitutes a valid field interview situation to guard
against its misuse and to minimize potentially adverse
citizen reactions. Field interview contacts may be docu-
mented to provide other officers, investigators, and crime
analysts with information concerning suspicious persons
and situations. 2
Thus, it appears that police chiefs have paid little attention
to Terry. I propose that this is so for four reasons.
First, chiefs do not want to deter officers from attempts to
detect and deter crime, or to put "suspicious persons" on notice
that they may carry guns or other contraband without fear of
[P] olicemen must judge from all the circumstances of the case what the in-
tention of the party is. In some cases no doubt can exist, as when the party
is attempting to break into a house, or is examining the doors and win-
dows, or endeavoring to take the property secretly. If the intention of the
party admits of a doubt, the policeman will not act hastily, but will closely
watch the suspected party that he may discover his design.
If the policeman see any one carrying, or in any manner conveying any
goods, under circumstances which may lead to strong suspicions that they
may have been stolen, he should, particularly in the night, stop and exam-
ine the person; and if the appearance and manner of the party, his account
of himself and the goods, and all the circumstances of the case, should
leave no doubt that the goods have been stolen, he should arrest the person
and take possession of the goods; but if the suspicions of the policeman be
slight, he should not stop the person, but watch him to discover where the
goods may be deposited; and if he then become[s] fully convinced that the
property has been stolen, he will then make the arrest and take charge of
the goods.
MERIDEN POLICE GUIDE AND REFERENCE BOOK 51, 53 (B.R. Debbs ed., Bridgeport,
Marigold Printing 1895).
12 COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 41-42 (1994).
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discovery by aggressive officers. Groundless or not, there is a
fear among even the most progressive chiefs that clear specifica-
tion of the limits on officers' discretion will give some part of the
population the idea that the police have been handcuffed. For
these officials, ambiguity-about when officers can fire their
guns, use force, arrest, issue tickets or frisk-is the more certain
course.
Second, regardless of their legality, frisks that produce evi-
dence of crime are presumed to serve legitimate police purposes
(e.g., taking guns or drugs off the street, deterring weapons pos-
session). Further, the complaints of those subjected to such
tosses should not be legitimized because they come from people
who were, in fact, dirty, and who therefore have no right to
complain about police impropriety.
Third, regardless of legality, the costs of frisks that fail to
produce results are unclear. There is no physical harm to those
subjected to such searches. Further, many police and their
bosses do not regard people who are stopped and released as in-
nocent, but simply as not caught this time. In addition, as I have
found in training and talking with in-service officers and com-
manders in New York and elsewhere, some even argue that un-
fruitful frisks are a positive public relations device because they
demonstrate to the innocent citizens stopped that police are vig-
orously doing their jobs. A half-century ago, a Massachusetts
town's police pamphlet advised citizens that:
IF STOPPED BY POLICE
Do not be offended if questioned as to your identity and
business by a police officer. His assignments and routine
duty often require the identification of persons. Be glad
that he is on the job. Remember, his job requires that he
risk his life if necessary to protect you. Reputable persons
have nothing to fear from the police.
Your Police Department is anxious to give you the
maximum protection possible with the personnel and
equipment available. We solicit your co-operation in as-
sisting the police department to keep Longmeadow a re-
spected and law abiding community.
1
Unfortunately, this advice has not proven as soothing in our
'3 LONGMEADOW POLICE, GUARDIANS OF YOUR PROPERTY AND WELFARE 15
(1949).
[Vol. 72:12311238
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diverse inner-cities as it may have been in small-town 1940's
New England. The perceived arbitrariness of police stop, ques-
tion and frisk practices have proven to be among the most per-
sistent grievances of residents in areas that have been torn by
disorder.
14
Fourth, the difference between a Terry stop and simply
speaking with people is unclear. In practice, as some of the ma-
terials cited in this paper demonstrate, there often is no bright
line between merely initiating a conversation with a person who
looks vaguely wrong and detaining someone against his will. On
the street, both interactions usually begin with words like, "Hi,
can I talk to you for a minute?" or "How you doing? I was hoping
you'd be able to help me with something here." A long-used In-
ternational Association of Chiefs of Police text, for example, dis-
cusses "The Field Inquiry," and draws little distinction between
casual interviews and evidence-based field interrogations:
Stopping and questioning persons observed in the vicinity
of the crime scene; checking the identification of someone
resembling a suspected criminal; exerting the added effort
to talk to the stranger on the beat, or to the individual
whose behavior arouses suspicions, are proven methods of
establishing identifications, of obtaining information and
of preventing crimes from being committed.
A Source of Information
The field inquiry is based upon the principle that the op-
portunity to apprehend criminals and to prevent crimes
increases with the number and frequency of persons in-
terviewed.
No police officer can physically observe or have complete
knowledge of all the criminal activities occurring within
his beat. One way of extending his power of observation is
to obtain information from persons living or working
within his patrol area.
The field inquiry serves this purpose as it goes further
than questioning those suspected of committing a crime.
It seeks information from any person who may possess it.
14 See generally JAMES KOLTS ET AL., THE Los ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
(1992); REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMM'N]; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra
note 7.
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The non-criminal subject may describe the activities of a
criminal living within the area or provide important in-
formation which will aid an investigation. The field con-
tact can also be used to verify or disprove the alibi of an
arrested suspect. In fact, information which otherwise
would not be uncovered can be obtained by the officer who
will question those who arouse his suspicions even though
he realizes that many of the field contacts will be disap-
pointing."5
C. WHAT GOOD IS ACCOMPLISHED BY TERRY STOPS?
The interactions most clearly definable as Terry stops occur
in two circumstances: on particularized suspicion of a specific
crime, or on an officer's general, but articulable, suspicion that a
person is, in the police vernacular, wrong or dirty.6 Beyond the
fact that, in cases like Terry itself, a stop, detention and, where
appropriate, a frisk, is the only reasonable police alternative un-
" INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE PATROL OPERATION
64-65 (3d ed. 1977).
'6 Regardless of how much the requirements for a Terry stop may be exceeded
by apparently clear and specific evidence, there are no guarantees in police work.
On a warm summer Sunday morning in the mid-1960's (again, in the pre-radio era),
I was assigned to a church crossing at the Plymouth Church of the Pilgrims, the his-
toric Brooklyn Heights congregation founded by Henry Ward Beecher. As usual
during the summer, business was nearly nonexistent because most of the congrega-
tion was at their summer or weekend homes. Then, I saw two patrol cars roll up to a
residential hotel a couple of blocks away. Since department policy placed primacy on
crossing duty, I could leave to see whether they needed my help only at the risk of
discipline for being off-crossing, a mortal sin. After a time, one of the two crews
emerged, got into their car, and slowly drove my way. They advised me that the ho-
tel had been held up by a well-dressed white man with a short haircut, a brown
sports jacket, a white shirt, a red tie, and a large semi-automatic pistol. Fortu-
nately, as it turned out, I noted this in my memo book, and kept my eyes peeled. A
few minutes later, a man appeared, quickly walking in my direction. He was white,
well-dressed, had a short haircut, and wore a brown sports jacket, a white shirt, and
a red tie, and carried a leather pouch under his arm. Except for my colleagues, he
was the first person I had seen on the street that morning. He had not seen me, so I
ducked behind a large tree, drew my gun, and waited for him to pass. As he did, I
jumped out from my hiding place, grabbed him by the back of the neck, and
slammed him into a wall. The pouch fell, and I grabbed it, expecting to find that it
contained the pistol. It did not; it contained a bible and a sermon, and my bad guy
turned out to have been the church pastor en route to services. I was nonplused and
more than a little anxious to get out of his company as quickly as possible. He was
stunned and more than slightly disheveled. I explained to him what had happened
and, thankfully, was able to show him the description I had previously recorded. We
parted on friendly terms and he continued to church, where he no doubt referred in
his sermon to Paul's experience on the road. Still, I have always wondered....
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der the circumstances, such stops do accomplish several pur-
poses. Regardless of whether Terry and company were planning
a stick-up, they sure looked like they were, and they were, in
fact, found in possession of two illegally concealed firearms. The
field interrogations that my colleagues and I conducted solved
many crimes, some of which had not yet been discovered when
their perpetrators were stopped and questioned for suspicious
behavior. 7 In addition, the field interrogation reports filed by
the officers in the former 18th Precinct, now Midtown North and
in the 114th Precinct in Astoria, both of which were where I had
been a sergeant, also provided us with much useful information
in linking Terry subjects who had been released to crimes that
were subsequently reported.
There is also some evidence that, if the public knows the po-
lice will be taking Terry up to its limits, those who would other-
wise be carrying guns might actually leave them at home. In
Richmond, California, where I am currently working on a fed-
erally funded homicide prevention study, it appears that the po-
lice seizure of guns in this manner has encouraged gang-bangers
to leave their arms at home and has substantially reduced gang
and gun homicides.18
In addition, just as it is difficult to suggest reasonable alter-
natives that might have been employed by Detective McFadden,
it is difficult on the macro-level to suggest alternatives that po-
lice might employ to accomplish the purposes served by Terry.
One alternative is to do nothing, and to instruct officers to re-
frain from action until actual crimes have been observed.
Such is the procedure still followed by the Los Angeles Police
Department's Special Investigation Section (SIS). While ordi-
nary Los Angeles patrol officers often are accused of crossing the
17 Indeed, one (much like that anticipated in the Meriden Police Guide, see, su-
pra note 11) resulted in the arrest of a young man whom my partner and I observed
carrying a typewriter and sneaking in and out of the shadows on Brooklyn's Court
Street at about 4:00 am. We stopped, questioned, and frisked him and wound up ar-
resting him for carrying burglar's tools (a screwdriver, knife, and cutting pliers)
when he was able to give only some lame explanation of the typewriter (e.g., "I
found it" or "I just bought it from a guy"). When the sun rose, the staff of St. John's
University School of Law (then located on Schermerhorn Street in downtown
Brooklyn) called to report that they were looking for an IBM Selectric that had been
stolen during an overnight burglary. Of course, the numbers matched.
18 See JAMES J. FYFE ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING HOMICIDE: THE
COMPREHENSIVE HOMICIDE INITIATIVE IN RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA (1997).
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line to impropriety in conducting Terry stops, 9 the elite SIS re-
frains from intervening in circumstances that merely are rea-
sonably suspicious. Instead, SIS follows suspects, observes them
while they commit crimes like the ones it is presumed that Terry
and his friends were planning, and confronts them forcibly when
they emerge. This results in the deaths of some suspects-
about one for every twenty-five arrested-and the presentation
of very strong cases against those who survive. It also results in
wholesale violation of the police obligation to protect life, and in
a population of terrorized victims who have been robbed and bru-
talized while police stood by.2"
In one SIS case, for example, the unit followed four robbery
suspects to a McDonald's Restaurant, watched for several hours
while the suspects cased the store until it closed and was occu-
pied only by a 24-year-old female manager. SIS then observed
while the suspects donned ski-masks, walked to the side of the
store, and kicked in its door. When the terrified manager called
911, the SIS canceled the resulting calls for patrol cars, and
waited outside while the robbers threatened her with guns
(which turned out to have been toys), duct-taped the victim's
mouth, arms, and legs, put her in a refrigerator, and opened the
safe. When the robbers emerged, they entered their car, where
SIS used two unmarked police vehicles to jam them in their
parking space, killed three and wounded one with 226 shotgun
and pistol projectiles. In dismissing the possibility of using a
timely Terry stop to prevent such bloodshed, then-LAPD Chief
Daryl Gates said that: "If they [the SIS] had taken them outside
[the restaurant before they entered it], they [the suspects] would
have been out on bail today, and probably robbing someone
else.... Now there won't be any more of these robberies at
McDonald's. Perhaps we accomplished something."21
'9 See CHRISTOPHER COMM'N, supra note 14, at 75-77.
20 In several cases, SIS has stood by while suspects to whom they had been
tipped cased premises, donned masks or wigs, drew guns and held up stores or
banks. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND
THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 146-64 (1993); see also Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F.
Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1997); District Court's Response to Petition for Mandamus in
Gates v. District Court, CV-96-2666-JSL (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 1998).
21 David Parrish, Gates, Commissioner Say Police Acted Properly in Sunland
Shootings, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14, 1990, at N4.
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D. THE DOWNSIDES OF TERRY
SIS is an extreme. But it is fair to say that, because Terry
allows the police to take limited preemptive actions, it helps to
detect and deter crime and to prevent bloodshed; who knows how
many SIS analogues would exist in other police departments if
officers had to wait until they had probable cause befare taking
action. Certainly, however, the activity clarified by Terry is
fraught with problems. Terry stops are almost exclusively dis-
cretionary matters that typically take place on quiet streets, and
that cannot easily be reconstructed. Consequently, they are very
difficult to regulate.22 A Terry stop says terrible things about its
subject; it is the officer's way of telling a person you look wrong
and I am going to check out my feelings about you even if it em-
barrasses you. In big cities, Terry is invariably tied to questions
of race. As John Boydstun noted in one of the few empirical
studies, Terry stops reduced suppressible crime, but also had a
great potential for increasing police-community tensions.3
Further, there is no industry standard as to what would
comprise an acceptable batting average, or how many false posi-
tives occur. When I taught at John Jay College of Criminal Jus-
tice during the 1970s, for example, one of my students was a
Transit Authority police officer who boasted during a lecture on
22 On my first night as a sergeant in midtown Manhattan, I was surprised when
officers coming in at the end of their tours turned in dozens of completed field inter-
rogation forms: I got as many completed reports in that one night as I had seen in
the prior seven and a half years as a cop in Brooklyn. In Manhattan, it turned out,
the practice was to follow the department requirement to prepare these forms
whenever a field interrogation was conducted; in Brooklyn, nobody completed these
reports unless there was reason to believe that the subjects of field interrogations
would complain about the behavior of the officers involved. Obviously, had anybody
in Police Headquarters been monitoring the process, this discrepancy would have
been noticed and some explanation would have been demanded. This never hap-
pened.
A technique I tried to use when stops made pursuant to specific information
turned up the wrong people was to share the information with the subjects of the
stop. Thus, just as I showed the minister the description that I had written, I often
asked the radio dispatcher to rebroadcast descriptions for the benefit of people who
had no idea why I had stopped and frisked them. When satisfied that I had the
wrong people, I would invite them to stand by the car radio, and would tune it up to
full volume before engaging in exchanges like the following, "84-Adam to Central.
Please repeat the description of the males sought in the mugging in Fulton Street."
Reply, "Adam, that's three male blacks, ages eighteen to twenty, dark complected.
White tee-shirts, jeans, sneakers, short haircuts. Thin builds, last running north on
Duffield Street." The response when Terry subjects heard these exchanges usually
was to the effect that, "Hey, that sounds just like us. All right, man."
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Terry that he made drug possession arrests every night. Several
other students and I were interested in how he managed to do
this. His technique was simple: He tossed creeps every night
until he found one who was dirty. Then he passed the rest of the
night booking his creep, and spent the following day in court
rather than under the Crossroads of the World. On some nights,
he came up with a hit on his first toss, on other nights, he would
search 100 or more creeps before finding his way out of the un-
derground. Not uncommonly, his supervisor and commander re-
garded him as an asset, and one of his unit's most valuable and
active officers. Apparently, they heard little or nothing from the
creeps who were not carrying drugs. 4 This sort of conduct is
sometimes given not-so-subtle approval by police administrators
and trainers. Consider the advice presented in a volume that is
widely used by California police officers:
The population of American communities, and especially
of large cities, is undergoing changes. Every year the per-
centage of minority citizens is increasing. Unlike the
white middle-class citizen, they do not seem ready to ac-
cept the number of criminals arrested by improper tactics
as justification for continuing this practice. They are the
ones most often stopped during field interrogations. They
are the ones who seem to be more often subjected to im-
proper treatment. Because of this, officers making field
stops must always bear in mind that they will be required
to firmly justify their suspicions in court. No longer will
"He just didn't look right" be justification enough for field
interrogation. Officers should therefore train themselves
to base their suspicions upon a firmfoundation [sic]; no
relying on a so-called sixth sense. This can be done with
the proper training and effort...."
4 See JOHN E. BOYDSTUN, SAN DIEGO FIELD INTERROGATION: FINAL REPORT
(1975). An NYPD officer who apparently employed a similar modus operandi ended
his career not far from St. John's University by shooting and killing a "suspicious"
nine-year old boy. Officer Thomas Shea's personnel file was filled with sparkling
evaluations and supervisory comments about his outstanding arrest activity. On
closer examination, however, his arrests consisted almost exclusively of possessory
offenses (guns, knives, drugs) that, it appeared, could have been discovered only by
conducting broad scale, and probably unjustifiable, Terry stops and searches. There
was no indication in the records I reviewed that Shea had ever conducted a Terry
stop that did not produce evidence of a crime, so it is likely that, like my student, he
simply never reported these. See TOM HAUSER, THE TRIAL OF PATROLMAN THOMAS
SHEA (1980).
2 GEORGE T. PAYTON & MICHEL AMARAL, PATROL OPERATIONS AND EN-
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What then are the clues by which an officer will know
who to stop and when to stop him? Such a list would be
endless, but some of the more common are:
1) A subject who is out of place. By knowing the beat
and its people, an officer can be more cognizant of a
person who does not fit the situation. For example, an
exceptionally well dressed man who is hanging around
a "Skid row." He may be a homosexual who is solicit-
ing partners, or he may be a heterosexual seeking a
prostitute, or a gambler looking for a dice game. He
may just be "slumming," wanting to see how the other
half lives. In any event, he will soon be picked out as a
"mark" by the local inhabitants who are always look-
ing for a fast buck. Before long this person can become
the victim of a crime. In an effort to prevent this
crime, or to stop the subject from becoming involved in
a criminal action, the beat officer should make an ef-
fort to have the subject leave the area. This may be
done in many ways. The conversation could be started
with, "Good evening, sir. Are you looking for a particu-
lar place? Maybe I can help you." This will set the
stage by establishing the fact that it is obvious to the
officer that the subject does not belong in this setting.
The officer's next move will depend upon the subject's
answer to this offer of help. If he states that he is just
passing through, the matter can be dropped, because
he will leave the area even if he hadn't originally in-
tended to. He will naturally not reveal his true pur-
pose for being in the area, as it is more than likely il-
legal....
At the other end of the scale we find a person who is
obviously a bum in a high class or residential area.
His true purpose may be to beg for money or hand-
outs, or to case the area for petty theft or burglary.
When there was a vagrancy law in effect, it was sim-
ply a matter of telling the subject that if he didn't
leave the area, he would be "booked for vag." With this
law declared unconstitutional, the officer must use
other means. Often just stopping the subject and
talking to him will solve the problem. He may explain
that he is lost and would the officer kindly tell him the
direction to "Skid row" or the local "jungle." As a
FORCEMENT TACTICS 195-96 (9th ed. 1993).
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safety measure, the officer should transport him from
the area....
Should the subject be "con wise" and tell the officer
that he is just out walking and has done nothing
wrong, the officer may use a little subterfuge. He or
she may indicate that there has been a "peeping Tom"
in that area, and that the local residents are really
upset. Some of them have even threatened to shoot
him on sight. The officer could explain that he or she
is sure that the subject is not a "peeping Tom," but
that a stranger who hangs around this area under the
circumstances is really sticking his neck out. There
are any number of similar subterfuges that can be
used....
(6) Older men in the company of young females. Older
men in the company of young females can mean trou-
ble. It may be a father and daughter. It doesn't take a
long surveillance to determine if that is so. Their ex-
pressions and gestures will soon tell. Many times the
young girl is a prostitute who has run away from
home....
There are certain characteristics that are common to
bums. An officer soon learns these characteristics after
booking enough of them. The bum who is transient will
usually be wearing two pairs of trousers and two shirts to
keep him warm at night. In his pocket he will usually
have an unassembled safety razor in a cloth tobacco such
as the type containing Bull Durham....
A person who has been in prison a long time becomes
quite adept at talking through the side of his mouth. He
also develops a way to hide inner emotion through the
display of a poker face. It can be quite noticeable when a
police officer passes this person on the street. Other peo-
ple passing by will at least give the officer a glance. The
ex-con will walk by as though the police officer were not
even there. His effort to conceal his concern will actually
give him away.26
E. So WHAT?
The practices of my students, as well as those encouraged by
" Id. at 203 ,206, 209.
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Payton and Amaral suggest that field interviews, interrogations
and frisks can easily be used to harass or to ensure that people
do not wander from where officers feel they belong. In seeking to
eliminate these abuses, however, we should take care not to dis-
card the flexibility of an approach that allows police to prevent
crime and bloodshed, rather than to risk bloodshed by waiting
until after crimes have occurred before taking official action.
One SIS is one too many.
The way to achieve this is to limit police officer's discretion
in conducting field interrogations and to hold them accountable
for abiding by the discretionary parameters under which they
operate. The best place to accomplish this-at least at first-is
not in the courtroom, but rather by the application of the model
of what the New York Joint Council did in 1964 in police com-
mand offices. As street-wise cops frequently observe, there are
no Supreme Court police who can assure that officers do the
right thing in the street. Police chiefs do have access to supervi-
sors, and to reward and disciplinary systems that, while not per-
fect, have enormous effect on police conduct. Indeed, virtually
all the relevant research has concluded that the major determi-
nant of officer's behavior in the streets is the philosophy and
policy of their chiefs."
Chiefs should take a more active role than they have in the
past in requiring that field interrogation be conducted properly.
This can be done by formulating clear policy consistent with
Terry and its progeny (complete with examples of what does and
does not constitute "reasonable suspicion" and "reasonable fear"),
by training officers carefully in the law and policy and by re-
warding officers who conduct Terry stops reasonably and well,
and by correcting officers who do not.
This is the approach in Dade County, Florida, where the po-
lice department includes field interrogations along with arrests,
summonses and responses to calls for service as measures of offi-
cers' activity. Granting credits for well-done Terry stops requires
27 See generally James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Re-
form, 5 JUST. Q. 165, 205 (1988); James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Po-
lice Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309-23 (1979);
Gerald Uelmen, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy Regarding the
Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 15, 59 (1973);
Mark Blumberg, The Use of Firearms by Police Officers: The Impact of Individuals,
Communities and Race (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of
New York at Albany) (on file with author).
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officers to report such stops, including, where possible, the iden-
tities of their subjects. This in turn allows detectives to use the
reports as a source of information, and allows supervisors to con-
tact subjects for feedback on their perceptions of the reasonable-
ness of the actions of the officers involved, as they do. What the
department has done, in other words, is fit the community's de-
sire to see that Terry stops are done reasonably with officer's
desire to be recognized for doing their jobs properly and for con-
tributing to the agency's crime-fighting mission.
Unfortunately, this approach is so unusual that most police
administrators to whom I mention it regard it as unworkable pie
in the sky. But, in fact, it was instituted during the reforms put
in place after the 1981 Miami riot, was working well when I
studied the Metro-Dade Police Department during 1985 and
1986, and still works today. It is time for police chiefs to use it
as an example of what can be done with Terry when they strike
the balance between properly aggressive policing and respect for
citizen's rights and dignity.
28
28 Data on the frequency of Terry stops is rare, but we did collect some in the
project I directed in Dade, which was designed to enhance officers' responses to po-
tentially violent situations. As part of the research, I placed observers in police cars
with approximately 100 different officers for a total of 877 full eight-hour tours of
duty in the county's three busiest police districts. Terry stops occurred during fewer
than one-third (237) of these shifts. Officers conducted a total of 384 stops, or about
one for each 18 hours of patrol work. These same officers initiated 1,135 non-
adversarial conversations with citizens whom they did not suspect of any criminal
activity, or about one during every six hours of patrol duty. These frequencies were
comparable to what these officers' activity reports indicated they did when nobody
was directly observing their conduct. See JAMES J. FYFE, THE METRO-DADE PO-
LICE/CITIZEN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1988).
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